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CROWDFUNDING’S IMPACT ON 
START-UP IP STRATEGY 
Sean M. O’Connor* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Crowdfunding” has been heralded as a revolutionary and democratic 
way to connect ordinary individuals with innovative projects they would 
like to support. Congress endorsed this concept by including the 
CROWDFUND Act in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS 
Act” or “Act”) of 2012.1 The statute was not directed at well-known 
crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter and IndieGoGo—sites that facilitate 
“project crowdfunding” through a lightly regulated donation model. Rather, 
the JOBS Act provides a mechanism for ordinary investors and start-ups to 
use “enterprise crowdfunding,” in which the start-ups can offer and sell 
their stock widely through the Internet. These activities were effectively 
prohibited under pre-JOBS Act securities laws. 
While the JOBS Act was credited with creating a legal pathway for en-
terprise crowdfunding, start-ups cannot avail themselves of it until the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgates the rules mandat-
ed under the Act.2 At the same time, the Act mandates other changes in 
securities regulations which may make enterprise crowdfunding less ap-
pealing than other private financing options. The Act generally relaxed 
mandatory information disclosure requirements and the ability to use the 
Internet to solicit investment under these other options, even as it erected 
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 1 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-305, 126 Stat. 306, 315 
(2012). 
 2 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Crowdfunding]. The comments 
period ends February 3, 2014. Thus, a final rulemaking authorizing equity crowdfunding might be 
promulgated in spring or summer 2014. On October 23, 2013, the SEC issued proposed rules for “Regu-
lation Crowdfunding.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on 
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press
Release/1370540017677#.Uv-5-aDDhG4.  
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significant disclosure requirements for the new enterprise crowdfunding 
pathway.3 
A number of commentators are highly skeptical of enterprise 
crowdfunding or of the JOBS Act as a means to enable it. Some are worried 
about the potential for fraud and abuse.4 Others worry that small-time “re-
tail investors” who invest through crowdfunding in tech start-ups will not 
understand the dilution risks they face from later venture capital (“VC”) 
financing rounds.5 And a number fear that the regulatory hurdles required 
by the JOBS Act, and underscored in the SEC’s proposed rulemaking, will 
simply make the costs of enterprise crowdfunding too high for firms that 
might benefit from it.6 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, enterprise crowdfunding will be-
come a reality sooner rather than later, and tech start-ups will be among the 
first to explore using it. Yet no one appears to have written about the effects 
of enterprise crowdfunding on start-ups’ intellectual property (“IP”) strate-
gies. Because IP is arguably the most important asset a start-up holds, this 
relationship is worth considering. This Paper provides preliminary thoughts 
about this topic. 
The Paper proceeds in Part I by reviewing the crowdfunding landscape 
and its potential benefits for start-ups, especially with regard to IP strate-
gies. Part II examines the provisions of the JOBS Act and argues that the 
disclosure requirements of the CROWDFUND Act title will make the latter 
less attractive than other start-up financing options and may negatively af-
fect start-ups’ IP strategies, in part by risking the disclosure of enabling 
aspects of patentable inventions. Part III explores issues arising from the 
widespread involvement of many potentially unsophisticated investors who 
have no connection to the start-up. This contrasts with current unsophisti-
cated investors in start-ups who are usually limited to friends and family of 
the founders. The lack of a direct connection means that unsophisticated 
crowdfunding investors may neither understand the realities and risks of 
  
 3 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302, 126 Stat. at 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-
1(a)(3), (b)(1)(G) (2012)). 
 4 See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securi-
ties Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1763-66 (2012); Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious 
Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 389 (2012) (“Despite its promise, 
crowdfunding under the JOBS Act could fizzle or bomb. . . . There is . . . a chance that crowdfunding 
will become a tool for Internet frauds and schemes, at first harming investors and eventually scaring 
them away.”). 
 5 See John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L, 583, 616-19 
(2013). 
 6 See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 
SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 216-17 (2012); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: 
Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2012). 
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start-ups’ IP portfolios nor have the inside access to information and man-
agement that traditional friend and family investors enjoy. The Paper con-
cludes with suggestions for how start-ups should manage these issues, as 
the popular appeal of crowdfunding virtually ensures that start-ups will use 
it once the SEC promulgates the final rules implementing the 
CROWDFUND Act. 
I. THE CROWDFUNDING LANDSCAPE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR 
START-UPS 
While there seems to be no official definition of “crowdfunding,” it is 
generally understood to be the web-based general solicitation of funding for 
a venture, with the expectation that many contributors might each commit 
to only a small amount.7 In the aggregate, the amount contributed will 
hopefully be enough to fund the designated project or venture. Some legal 
commentators view all crowdfunding through the lens of “investments”—
even as they acknowledge that much of it does not involve equity or debt 
but rather donations or rewards.8 This misconception is unfortunate because 
it obscures crowdfunding’s origins and continuing vitality as a funding 
mechanism for cultural or nonprofit projects that will neither be “commer-
cial” nor profitable. Thus, there is neither an “investment” (other than as we 
might say that a philanthropist “invests” in a charitable project) nor interest 
in financial return. The most famous crowdfunding sites—Kickstarter9 and 
IndieGoGo10—are by their own terms and intent not investment oriented. 
Likewise, Kiva, the famous crowdfunded micro-lending site, intends to 
economically benefit only the poor individuals who receive micro-loans 
through it.11 
One accepted taxonomy breaks crowdfunding into four categories: (1) 
donation sites; (2) reward and pre-purchase sites; (3) lending sites (both 
those offering interest and those that do not); and (4) equity sites.12 This 
framework is reasonable based on the nature of the “transaction.” It also 
aids analyses of whether particular kinds of transactions might be consid-
ered “securities” that fall within the regulation of the securities laws—an 
issue of major concern to all involved with crowdfunding of any stripe. 
For the purposes of this Paper, a simple bifurcation suffices: “project 
crowdfunding,” in which contributors fund a defined project; and “enter-
  
 7 See, e.g., Crowdfunding, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdfunding (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014). 
 8 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10-27 (referring to even charitable donors as “investors”). 
 9 KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 10 INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 11 About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 12 Bradford, supra note 8, at 14-27. 
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prise crowdfunding,” where investors contribute capital that can be used as 
capital for ongoing general operating and development expenses of an or-
ganization.13 Kickstarter and IndieGoGo are firmly in the project camp, and 
this helps them avoid securities law issues. Kiva engages in enterprise 
crowdfunding, but through micro-loans that do not generate interest or any 
direct economic benefit to the funders. Part II briefly reviews the funda-
mentals of what makes something a security and how those fundamentals 
bear on whether a particular type of crowdfunding will be deemed a securi-
ty. 
The bifurcation model is important because building an IP portfolio 
for a start-up is a long-term capital expense.14 Individual IP assets can of 
course arise from discrete projects, but the funding model for each project 
often does not include monies for IP procurement. This situation is espe-
cially true for patents, which will take a year or more and tens of thousands 
of dollars to prosecute. Prolonged litigation can quickly diverge from the 
project timeline. Further, it is hard to know during advance financial plan-
ning for a project whether inventions will arise that need to be budgeted for. 
Thus, such funding may be left out of project budgets. Cash-strapped start-
ups, particularly those run by first-time entrepreneurs, often do not budget 
for patent prosecution because they have not thought of it, do not under-
stand the magnitude of costs, or simply cannot do it due to lack of forecast-
ed investments and revenues. 
For those start-ups that do seek to budget for IP, the question is where 
to get the money. Technology start-ups generally will have no revenue for a 
number of years while developing their products/services and business 
model. Even when revenues come in, the monies may barely offset fixed 
costs of salaries, facilities, and supplies. Hence the start-up metric of “burn 
rate”—the amount of money beyond revenues the company will burn each 
month as it develops products/services. An IP budget will be far down the 
list of expenses to be budgeted for. Thus, it will have to come from capital 
investments. 
VC-funded start-ups can usually budget for IP expenses. Venture capi-
tal fund managers (“VCs”) understand both burn rate and the need for IP 
protection. In fact, anecdotally speaking, VCs balk at a possible investment 
if the founders seem to be low-balling their burn rate and expenses. VCs 
expect relatively high burn rates—the focus is on fast development, launch, 
and growth, not penny-pinching. While there is mixed evidence as to the 
insistence of VCs for patent protection in some industries (e.g., software), 
  
 13 Professor Mirit Eyal-Cohen pointed out to me that nonprofits could use enterprise 
crowdfunding as well. They would of course need another mechanism besides equity to accomplish this. 
 14 Many of the comments in the remainder of this Part are derived from personal experience as 
counsel to start-up companies over 10 years in private practice and through the Entrepreneurial Law 
Clinic at UW Law School (“UW ELC”). Entrepreneurial Law Clinic, U. OF WASH. SCH. OF L., 
http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/entrepreneurial (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
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in other industries it is imperative.15 And in all industries, VCs will still 
want to see some form of IP protection (if only trade secrets) at least un-
til/unless first mover advantage is achieved. Law firms representing start-
ups involved in a professional money raise from VCs will counsel founders 
to include these kinds of capital needs in the discussions and in the amount 
sought. 
Angel-funded start-ups can be in a different position. Sophisticated 
tech-focused angels, such as those in Silicon Valley and Seattle, will oper-
ate similarly to VCs with regard to burn rate and IP expenses. Angels in 
those markets are often former tech professionals who had a great exit as 
either an employee or founder of another tech company, and so they know 
the importance of IP and fast-growth funding.16 But angels in other markets 
may not understand the start-up trajectory and needs. In those cases, IP 
budget funding may not be available, with potentially deleterious conse-
quences on the start-up’s ability to monetize its investment in R&D. 
The acute problem, however, is for start-ups that are bootstrapping17 or 
relying (so far) only on friend and family investments. Unless the friends 
and family are quite generous and savvy to the needs for fast-growth and IP 
funding, they may not be willing to invest funds for patent procurement.18 
Where there are no funds, there will be no ability to pursue patent applica-
tions.19 The opportunity for pursuing patent applications is also not espe-
cially flexible. Should the start-up deliver products or services embodying 
  
 15 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results 
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1259, 1295-1302 (2009); Ted 
Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 113, 117-19 (2010). 
 16 I adopt the definition of “angels” as high-net-worth individuals investing directly in a start-up 
(or at most through a personal investment vehicle). By contrast, “VCs” are the managers of a VC fund 
who make portfolio company investment decisions on behalf of the fund. They may “co-invest” their 
own money alongside that of the fund, but their main function is as fund managers. 
 17 Using the founders’ own money and, often, their personal credit card debt. 
 18 Procurement of other forms of IP is far less expensive than that for patents. Trade secrets are 
“free” in that they only require physical protections against disclosure and legally binding agreements 
such as nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements with those who need to practice them on behalf of 
the start-up or its suppliers. Copyright is “free” in that it inheres automatically upon the fixation of the 
expression in a tangible medium; registration with the Copyright Office is required in order to bring 
court enforcement actions of one’s copyright, and is advisable earlier for full protection of rights, but is 
fairly inexpensive. Trademarks and trade dress rights are also “free,” as they accrue as a matter of state 
law on use of the mark on products/services in commerce. Federal registration is desirable, and requires 
basic examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), but the cost to do this is still 
relatively low. 
 19 Some law school clinics, such as UW ELC, provide limited low- or no-cost patent application 
services to low-income inventors, with the inventor responsible only for out-of-pocket costs such as 
USPTO fees. The USPTO has also coordinated development of consortiums of pro bono patent attor-
neys in certain markets to deliver low- or no-cost patent applications on a similar basis. Programs cur-
rently exist in Minneapolis, Seattle, and other cities across the country. See, e.g., Pro Bono, U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/inventors/proseprobono (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
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the invention, before filing a patent application, it may lose its rights to file 
under Section 102(b)(1).20 Similarly, public use or disclosure of the inven-
tion before filing the application may also lead to a loss of patent rights.21 
The rules are effectively the same in many other countries. For fast-growth 
companies with global ambitions, this result could be quite detrimental to 
their plans. At the same time, the possible need for foreign filings will only 
add to the expected patent procurement budget.22 
Start-ups arguably need patents even more than established firms do. 
Patents provide a critical tool in the David-and-Goliath competition they 
will have with larger incumbents in the field they seek to disrupt.23 Incum-
bents can wait for the start-up to invest significant resources in developing 
and launching a valuable new good or service and then simply copy it, us-
ing their economies of scale, existing manufacturing, and lack of R&D 
costs to deliver the good or service more cheaply and broadly. While some 
could argue this benefits society and is in the nature of free market competi-
tion, it seems likely to discourage start-ups that will not be able to obtain 
fair returns on their R&D. With so much innovation coming from start-ups, 
these hurdles will likely reduce overall innovation, producing a net social 
cost (assuming one sees innovation as a desideratum). Patents allow start-
ups to appropriate the value of their R&D results by giving them legally 
enforceable exclusive rights that can be exercised against large incumbents 
seeking to copy the start-ups’ innovations.24 
Given the need for patents and other IP, start-ups desperately need 
funds to procure these rights. If they cannot secure them from VCs, angels, 
friends and family, or their own personal resources, they need another ave-
nue. Given the interest in funding innovation evinced by contributors to 
Kickstarter, IndieGoGo, and similar sites, crowdfunding seems to be a natu-
ral fit. But the existing sites allow only project funding. Thus, a start-up 
  
 20 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012). 
 21 Id. There is a limited grace period for public disclosures of inventions in some circumstances, 
but inventors should not rely on it without careful guidance from a patent attorney. 
 22 Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, inventors who are in Paris Convention signatory coun-
tries can file in their home jurisdiction as either “domestic” or “international” applicants and then file 
national applications in other Paris Convention countries within the year. See PCT FAQs, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/faqs/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). But these 
rights will only be available if the applicant files in his or her home jurisdiction before any sale, public 
use, or disclosure. 
 23 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring); see 
also Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litiga-
tion of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577–87 (2009); Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff & 
Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance and Innova-
tion, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222 (2008) (“[P]atents are powerful antimonopoly weapons—the 
vital slingshots ‘Davids’ use to take on ‘Goliaths.’”). 
 24 Even with patents, many start-ups face significant challenges from deep-pocketed incumbents 
who may seek to infringe the start-up’s rights anyway, forcing the start-up to engage in expensive and 
distracting litigation. 
2014] CROWDFUNDING’S IMPACT ON START-UP IP STRATEGY 901 
would have to seek project-based contributions for patent and other IP ex-
penses. It is not clear that crowdfunding recipients are accountable for their 
use of funds received by the sites’ terms and conditions (or otherwise).25 
Conceivably, a start-up could simply hope to raise enough project funding 
to cover the costs of the projects, any rewards that must be delivered (in-
cluding delivery costs!), and procurement of IP arising from the project. So 
long as the rewards are fulfilled when the project is completed, then this 
appears to discharge the project creator’s obligations under the terms and 
conditions. However, given the project-based sites’ insistence that only 
projects be funded, the nature of patent prosecution costs as arguably enter-
prise capital expenses may mean that something beyond a project is being 
funded. At the same time, nothing in the terms and conditions of these sites 
indicate that a project creator is limited to the collection of the actual costs 
of developing and delivering the project rewards. Presumably, the creator 
can set any contribution levels for rewards, including a “profit” margin. The 
market will determine whether contributors want to contribute that amount. 
This “loophole” likely just underscores the origins of these crowdfunding 
sites as a means to fund otherwise un-fundable projects—meaning things 
not expected to be profitable. Whatever the intent, at this point the financ-
ing of IP procurement from project crowdfunding may sit in a contractual 
gray area. 
Equity enterprise crowdfunding would remove any uncertainty about 
the use of funds for IP procurement. Monies received would be capital in-
vestments based on issuance of stock, bonds, or debentures.26 Unless the 
terms of such instruments limited the use of proceeds and excluded IP ex-
penses, the start-up could use the funds for any lawful capital expenses.27 
What often surprises first-time entrepreneurs is that patent procurement 
expenses may be the single largest cash outlay they will have to make. 
While the fair market value of salaries will be larger, the actual cash outlay 
is only a fraction of that total value because significant portions of compen-
sation will be through stock grants and options. Some other costs can be 
mitigated by issuance of stock options as well.28 But few good patent attor-
neys will take equity for their services. There is too much quality-billable-
hour-paying work from established companies for patent attorneys to 
  
 25 See, e.g., Terms of Use, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/terms-of-use?ref=footer 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014); Guidelines, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/guidelines?
ref=footer (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 26 The SEC supports the full range of debt and equity securities for crowdfunding. See 
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,457-58. 
 27 Under the proposed “Regulation Crowdfunding,” as it is known, the issuer must disclose the 
use of proceeds in any crowdfunding offering. Id. at 66,440. 
 28 Founders sometimes become too cavalier in using equity to pay for things. This can lead to a 
bloated capitalization table (the table showing how the company is capitalized), which in turn can deter 
later professional investors such as VCs. This is discussed further in Part II. 
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speculate on equity.29 Thus, crowdfunding could turn into a critical source 
of cash to procure patents in a timely fashion. 
Enterprise crowdfunding is needed for start-ups to plan and execute 
proper IP strategies, which in turn provide bedrock value assets for the firm. 
While angel- or VC-funded start-ups will not have this same need, they are 
the minority of start-ups. Project crowdfunding might enable some start-ups 
to fund IP procurement, but this likely cannot be an explicit goal of such 
fundraising (under the most popular sites’ terms of service). Plus the 
crowdfunding “market” might be unwilling to allow start-ups to covertly 
price IP procurement into contribution amounts (i.e., potential funders will 
not contribute to a campaign, correctly deeming the value of the express 
project’s reward lower than the amount requested). Any use of funds raised 
for the “project” which instead go to IP procurement may fall into a legal 
gray zone with regard to the start-up’s contractual relationship with the 
crowdfunding site and the quasi-contract relationship with funders. Accord-
ingly, enterprise crowdfunding presents the “cleanest” solution to the prob-
lem. But selling unregistered equity, such as that issued by pre-IPO start-
ups, through mass-market channels was one of the core prohibitions of the 
securities laws before passage of the JOBS Act. Thus, the next Part unpacks 
the changes the Act makes to securities laws to allow enterprise 
crowdfunding and other avenues for general solicitation of investors 
through the Internet. In particular, it focuses on the disclosure requirements 
for these different avenues. 
II. JOBS ACT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS’ IMPACT ON CROWDFUNDING 
START-UPS 
The core premise of the federal securities laws is that the government 
should not review the merits of investments represented by offers of securi-
ties, but rather simply mandate disclosures from the issuers of these securi-
ties so that investors can make reasonably informed decisions.30 The form 
and scope of disclosure sought by lawmakers at the time of drafting the 
laws would have placed prohibitive costs on smaller issuers. Thus, a dis-
tinction was created between “private” and “public” issuers.31 Some securi-
ties issued by private issuers are exempted from registration with the SEC, 
  
 29 Admittedly there might be more upside for the attorney who takes equity—and the client’s 
stock becomes highly valuable—but in most cases equity stakes turn out to be worthless. Thus, patent 
attorneys in private practice strongly prefer hourly cash rates, and high ones at that, given their exper-
tise. Those who want to take the equity route will often go in-house and become part of the team. This 
gives them more access to information on where the start-up is going, greater potential to help guide the 
start-up, a higher rate of equity compensation, and the excitement of being part of the team. 
 30 See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 29, 34 (1959). 
 31 Id. at 37. 
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and the issuer is not subject to mandatory disclosure, under Section 3 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).32 Securities of private issuers 
not exempted could still be sold without registration in certain exempted 
transactions under Section 4 of the Securities Act.33 Further sales of those 
securities would need to be pursuant to registered offerings or another ex-
empt transaction. In either case, the key to maintaining “private” status was 
to not engage in “general solicitations” or “public offerings.” 
While the line between offerings subject to registration and disclosure 
and those exempted was based on the public-private distinction, the exact 
nature of general solicitations or public offerings was not detailed in the 
Securities Act. Case law on the subject centered on tests of whether the 
offerees were part of a limited, defined set of persons who either had a sub-
stantial connection to the issuer or were sophisticated investors who could 
negotiate for the information and/or control rights that would enable them 
to make reasonable decisions as to initial investment and the period during 
which they might continue to hold the security.34 But there was great uncer-
tainty about how to ensure that any particular offering would be considered 
exempt. At the same time, structuring an offering incorrectly—even with 
good faith intent to avoid a public offering—meant that the offering could 
later be deemed to have violated Section 5 of the Securities Act as an un-
registered public offering.35 Potential penalties include rescission of the 
offer, fines, and even prohibition of future offerings.36 
A. Regulation D 
The uncertainty surrounding the proper structuring of private or lim-
ited offerings arguably led to fewer such offerings than would be optimal 
for small-firm capital raising and prompted the SEC in 1980 to promulgate 
Regulation D (“Reg D”).37 Three safe harbors for private offerings were 
created that, if complied with, would allow the issuer greater certainty that 
the offering would not later be deemed an illegal unregistered public offer-
ing. Rule 504, promulgated under Section 3 for exempt securities, allows an 
issuer to sell up to $1 million of unrestricted stock to any number of pur-
  
 32 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 75-77 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77c 
(2012)). 
 33 Id. at 77 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). 
 34 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953). 
 35 48 Stat. at 77-78 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77e). 
 36 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l. 
 37 Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers 
and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506). 
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chasers.38 Rule 505, promulgated under Section 4 for exempt transactions, 
allows an issuer to sell up to $5 million of restricted stock to up to thirty-
five non-accredited investors, plus any number of accredited investors.39 
The stock must be restricted because it was exempted from Section 5’s reg-
istration requirements only for the particular Rule 505-compliant offering. 
The purchaser buys under the express restriction—listed in a legend on the 
face of the stock certificate itself—that she may not resell it absent registra-
tion by the issuer or another exempt transaction. Likewise, Rule 506, also 
promulgated under Section 4, allows an issuer to sell an unlimited dollar 
value of restricted stock to up to thirty-five non-accredited investors, and an 
unlimited number of accredited investors, but only where the non-
accredited investors are themselves, or with their purchaser representative, 
“sophisticated.”40  
All of the safe harbors were originally subject to Rule 502’s prohibi-
tion on general solicitations.41 This condition was congruent with the secu-
rities laws’ focus on registering offerings of securities to the general public 
so that the SEC might ascertain that the information disclosed to potential 
investors adequately conveyed the nature and risks of the investment. Thus, 
the narrowly limited exception for general solicitations under Rule 504 was 
reserved for those offerings that were registered and subject to adequate 
information disclosure under a state’s securities laws.42 The prohibition on 
general solicitation meant that mass distribution channels of communicating 
offers to potential investors, such as the Internet, could not be used. This 
prohibition in turn effectively eliminated crowdfunding, at least under the 
current popular model facilitated by websites. 
  
 38 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2013). However, the issuer must offer and sell in compliance with state 
laws requiring registration and public filing of the registration statement, together with delivery of a 
substantive disclosure document to investors. 
 39 Id. § 230.505. Accredited investors include: (1) banks; (2) private business development corpo-
rations; (3) 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations and “Massachusetts or similar” trusts or business part-
nerships (not formed for the express purpose of buying the securities) with over $5 million in assets; (4) 
directors, executive officers, and/or general partners of the issuer; (5) natural persons, alone or with their 
spouse, having more than $1 million in net worth (not including value of primary residence); (6) natural 
persons who have had an annual income over $200,000 for the past two years, or who with their spouses 
have had an annual income over $300,000 for the past two years, and have a reasonable expectation of 
reaching the same income level in the current year; (7) any trust with over $5 million in assets (not 
formed for the express purpose of buying the securities), where the purchase of the securities is guided 
by a “sophisticated person” (as defined under Rule 506(b)(2)(ii)); and (8) any entity in which all entity 
owners are accredited purchasers. Id. § 230.501(a). 
 40 Id. § 230.506. A “sophisticated” investor is one who “alone, or with his purchaser representa-
tive(s), has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evalu-
ating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately 
prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.” Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 41 Id. § 230.502(c). Issuers could engage in general solicitation as part of a Rule 504 offering so 
long as they sold only to accredited investors. 
 42 Id. § 230.504(b)(i). 
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The limitations on offers and sales to non-accredited investors in Reg 
D offerings presented another serious impediment to crowdfunding. A cap 
of thirty-five non-accredited investors under Rule 505 and Rule 506 offer-
ings hardly rises to the level of what we think of as crowdfunding. While it 
is true that the number of accredited investors is not capped, the nature of 
such investors—as relatively wealthy individuals or entities—conflicts with 
the ambitions of crowdfunding to democratize investment. At the same 
time, Rule 504’s allowance of an unlimited number of non-accredited in-
vestors is tempered for the purposes of crowdfunding by the limit of the 
offering amount to $1 million. In the realm of project crowdfunding this 
change might seem to be no problem at all. Raising money through hun-
dreds or thousands of relatively small contributions is exactly what many 
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo campaigns do. In fact, the $1 million limit is 
probably higher than is raised in the average campaign. But start-ups that 
seek enterprise crowdfunding will likely need to raise more than $1 million. 
Even where the $1 million cap is not a hindrance, the start-up would still 
need to comply with the restrictions on general solicitation in order to run 
an Internet-based enterprise crowdfunding campaign. State-compliant offer-
ings are still allowed but are arguably limited to state-by-state registration, 
disclosure, and sales.43 They also require the costs of state registration and 
disclosure, which the start-up might not be able to afford (and if it could, it 
might just as well be able to register the offering for nationwide offers and 
sales with the SEC).  
The state of the Reg D safe harbors before passage of the JOBS Act 
effectively prohibited enterprise crowdfunding. Funding limits, general 
solicitation requirements, and limitations on the number of non-accredited 
investors conspired in the aggregate to limit enterprise crowdfunding to 
state-registered offerings of no more than $1 million. Bold issuers could 
seek to embark on an enterprise crowdfunding campaign claiming it was 
not a public offering, and thus exempt under Section 4(2) of the Securities 
Act. But the very use of a widely available website to advertise the fund-
raising would almost certainly be deemed a general solicitation, and be-
cause offers likely would not be limited to a certain group of investors, the 
offering would not fall under Section 4(2). The clamor for enterprise 
crowdfunding, in an ongoing recession, and in light of the success of pro-
ject crowdfunding, did not go unnoticed by Congress and the Obama ad-
ministration. 
  
 43 At least one company has engaged in a state-based enterprise crowdfunding campaign. See 
Ownership, BOGUS BREWING, http://www.bogusbrewing.com/ownership/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
Bogus Brewing engaged in a state-registered crowdfunding offering in Idaho, claiming an exemption 
from federal registration under Rule 504. However, it might equally have claimed the intrastate exemp-
tion under Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act. Thanks to Garrett Hall for bringing this example to my 
attention. 
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B. The JOBS Act 
In an effort to do something to help the still-ailing economy, Congress 
passed the JOBS Act in 2012.44 President Obama signed it into law on April 
5, 2012.45 It contained many different titles, loosely centered on ways to 
help start-ups raise capital. While the CROWDFUND Act within the JOBS 
Act for enterprise crowdfunding received significant attention, it is only one 
of the many titles within the overall bill. Some of the others may well have 
a bigger impact on start-ups than will the CROWDFUND Act. This Section 
briefly reviews all the titles within the JOBS Act. 
1. “Emerging Growth Companies” 
Title I creates a new issuer classification of “emerging growth compa-
nies” that enjoy relaxed mandatory disclosure rules.46 “Emerging growth 
companies” are simply issuers that had less than $1 billion in total annual 
gross revenues during their most recently completed fiscal year.47 This 
benchmark covers some fairly large businesses, so it is a generous cap. 
Such issuers are exempted from some of the disclosure requirements on 
executive compensation for reporting companies.48 They also need only 
disclose two years’ worth of audited financial statements upon registration 
for an initial public offering (“IPO”).49 Emerging growth companies do not 
need to have their internal control systems evaluated by their outside audi-
tors.50 They also are provisionally exempted from the auditor rotation and 
supplemental audit information required of reporting companies under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.51 Perhaps most importantly, Title I relaxes the re-
strictions on securities analysts, brokers, and dealers for communications 
made before, during, or immediately after an emerging growth company’s 
IPO, especially with regard to qualified institutional buyers and institutional 
accredited investors.52 It also permits emerging growth companies to submit 
confidential “draft” registration statements for their IPOs—in direct con-
  
 44 Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 45 Id.; President Obama Signs the JOBS Act, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.white
house.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/04/05/president-obama-signs-jobs-act.  
 46 § 101(a), 126 Stat. at 307. 
 47 Id. 
 48 § 102(a), 126 Stat. at 308-09. 
 49 § 102(b)-(c), 126 Stat. at 309-10. Other issuers need to disclose three years’ worth of audited 
financial statements at the time of registration. 
 50 § 103, 126 Stat. at 310. 
 51 § 104, 126 Stat. at 310. 
 52 § 105, 126 Stat. at 310-11. 
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trast with the existing regime in which any submitted registration statement 
is immediately made public through the EDGAR system.53 
2. General Solicitations Allowed for Rule 506 Offerings 
Title II requires the SEC to amend Rule 506 to allow general solicita-
tions for offerings under it.54 However, this exemption from the prohibition 
on general solicitations under Rule 502 is only available where all purchas-
ers of such offers are accredited investors.55 The Act also directs the SEC to 
modify the regulations of Rule 144A resales to allow offers to persons other 
than qualified institutional buyers, so long as such resales are only made to 
persons whom the seller, or its agent, reasonably believes is a qualified in-
stitutional buyer.56 Protections are also given to persons who create plat-
forms for new Rule 506 general solicitation offerings and Rule 144A re-
sales offerings.57 
3. Crowdfunding 
As can be Congress’s penchant, Title III was given an awkward formal 
title so that it could be turned into the acronym “CROWDFUND Act.”58 
The parameters through which it mandates the SEC to promulgate formal 
rules permitting a new class of exempt transactions under Section 4 of the 
Securities Act are complicated. The new exemption will cover only those 
offers and sales of a private issuer that: 
∗ raise no more than $1 million in the aggregate with all such similar-
ly exempt offerings in a twelve-month period; 
∗ do not exceed $2,000 or 5 percent of any particular investor’s net 
worth or annual income (where the net worth or annual income is less than 
$100,000) aggregated with all purchases by the investor of the issuer’s 
stock in a twelve-month period; 
  
 53 § 106(a), 126 Stat. at 312. 
 54 § 201, 126 Stat. at 313-15. The SEC issued its final rules relaxing the prohibition on general 
solicitations for Rule 506 offerings in July 2013. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicita-
tion and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (proposed July 
24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242). 
 55 § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 313-14. 
 56 § 201(a)(2), 126 Stat. at 314. 
 57 § 201(c), 126 Stat. at 314-15. 
 58 § 301, 126 Stat. at 315 (dubbing the Act “the ‘Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud 
and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012’ or the ‘CROWDFUND Act’”). 
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∗ do not exceed 10 percent, with a maximum cap of $100,000, of any 
particular investor’s annual income or net worth where the investors annual 
income or net worth are equal to or greater than $100,000; and 
∗ are conducted through a broker or funding portal complying with a 
new Section 4A added to the Securities Act, and the issuer complies with 
the provisions of Section 4A as well.59 
Crowdfunding issuers will have liability for material misstatements 
and omissions in disclosed material similar to that of IPO issuers.60 And 
crowdfunded securities will be subject to a one-year holding period, with 
limited exceptions.61 Issuers must use the private market intermediary por-
tals62 mandated under the CROWDFUND Act, but this means that such 
portals must be created.63 These portals will have significant responsibilities 
(and therefore potential liabilities) for obtaining and distributing infor-
mation on the issuers and background checks on officers, directors, and 
other persons holding more than 20 percent of an issuer’s securities.64 The 
portal also needs to ensure that investors are not exceeding their investment 
caps. 
The CROWDFUND Act also imposes substantial disclosure require-
ments on crowdfunding issuers. They must disclose to the SEC, the portal 
handling the offering, and investors the following: 
• name, legal status, physical address, and website address of issuer; 
• names of directors, officers, and other persons holding greater than 
20 percent of the issuer’s securities; 
• description of issuer’s business and a business plan; 
• certain financial disclosures, depending on which of the following 
three tiers they fall into: 
o Offerings of $100,000 or Less: most recent year’s income 
tax return; financial statements certified by principal execu-
  
 59 § 302(a), 126 Stat. at 315. The SEC has clarified an ambiguity in the investor income thresh-
olds. Because the JOBS Act refers both to “annual income or the net worth of the investor is less than 
$100,000,” id., and “annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more than $100,000,” id., 
someone with, for example, annual income less than $100,000 but net worth greater than or equal to 
$100,000 would seem to fall into both categories. The SEC proposes to treat both categories as conjunc-
tions (and not disjunctions), such that the lower category includes all those with annual income and net 
worth (each) less than $100,000, and the higher category includes all those with annual income and net 
worth (each) greater than or equal to $100,000. Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,429-30. 
 60 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2012). 
 61 Id. § 77d-1(d)-(e). 
 62 §§ 302, 304, 126 Stat. at 315-22. 
 63 § 302, 126 Stat. at 315-21. The SEC has extensive rules for such portals, or intermediaries, in 
its proposed “Regulation Crowdfunding.” See generally Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,458-96. 
 64 Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,437-38. 
2014] CROWDFUNDING’S IMPACT ON START-UP IP STRATEGY 909 
tive officer to be “true and complete in all material re-
spects”; 
o Offerings Above $100,000, Up to $500,000: financial state-
ments reviewed by an independent public accountant using 
professional standards and procedures, or standards and pro-
cedures established by the SEC; 
o Offerings Above $500,000: audited financial statements 
• description of stated purpose and intended use of proceeds; 
• target offering amount, deadline to reach the target, and regular pro-
gress updates; 
• price, or method for determining price, of securities; 
• description of ownership and capital structure of issuer, including: 
o terms of all classes of issuer’s securities, including how they 
may be modified and a summary of the differences among 
these classes, particularly how the rights of the crowdfunded 
securities might be limited, diluted, or qualified by the rights 
of any other class; 
o description of how principal shareholders’ rights may nega-
tively affect crowdfunding investors; 
o name and ownership level of each holder of more than 20 
percent of the issuer’s equity; 
o method of valuation for offered securities now and in the fu-
ture; 
o risks to crowdfunding investors related to being minority in-
vestors, together with risks associated with corporate actions 
(including additional share issuances, sale of issuer or assets 
of issuer, and transactions with related parties); and 
o any other information the SEC may require.65 
Following the offering, the issuer will have to file annual reports with 
the SEC which cover the results of operations and financial statements. 
Issuers must then provide the reports to investors. Under “Regulation 
Crowdfunding,” as the proposal is known, the SEC would require issuers to 
submit disclosures through the EDGAR system for public access.66 This 
disclosure requirement makes the crowdfunding exemption particularly 
problematic, as discussed in Part II.C below. 
Creating a crowdfunding exemption also means that the reporting 
company triggers under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act (the 
“Exchange Act”)67 have to be amended. The large number of investors in a 
  
 65 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b); Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,437-49. 
 66 Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,449-54. 
 67 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-78pp (2012)). 
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single crowdfunded offering may well bring the number of issuer investors 
over the current cap of five hundred non-accredited investors.68 According-
ly, the JOBS Act amends the Exchange Act to remove crowdfunding inves-
tors from the calculation of shareholders for purposes of triggering report-
ing company status.69 
4. “Regulation A+” 
On top of allowing general solicitations on Rule 506 offerings and cre-
ating the crowdfunding exemption, the JOBS Act also created what has 
been dubbed a “Regulation A+” exemption.70 The SEC had promulgated 
Regulation A “mini-offerings” in 1992.71 Under Regulation A, issuers can 
offer unrestricted stock in what is essentially a public offering, in amounts 
up to $5 million over a twelve-month period, without becoming a reporting 
company producing audited financial statements (unless they are otherwise 
available).72 The issuer also has to prepare and submit an offering statement 
on Form 1-A, which is similar to a public offering registration statement. 
But under the new Regulation A+, issuers can offer up to $50 million on 
similar conditions as the original Regulation A.73 
5. Raising the Triggers for Reporting Company Status 
The JOBS Act increased various triggers so that more companies can 
stay out of reporting company status longer.74 The number of shareholders 
was increased to two-thousand persons overall, or five hundred non-
accredited investors.75 Employees holding company securities obtained 
through employee compensation plans also do not now count toward these 
trigger levels.76 
  
 68 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012); §§ 501-04, 126 Stat. at 325-26. 
 69 § 303, 126 Stat. at 321. 
 70 § 402, 126 Stat. at 325. 
 71 Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,468 (proposed Aug. 13, 1992) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
 72 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2012). 
 73 § 401, 126 Stat. at 323-25. 
 74 §§ 501-04, 126 Stat. at 325-26. 
 75 § 501, 126 Stat. at 325. 
 76 § 502, 126 Stat. at 326. 
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6. Raising the Triggers for Bank Registration 
Title VI of the Act increases the triggers for banks and bank holding 
companies to have to register under Sections 12 and 15 of the Exchange 
Act.77 This trigger seems to have been a response to the issue of banks’ re-
duction of lending, especially to small businesses, in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis and subsequent recession. This solution seems a bit tangen-
tial to that problem. 
7. Comparison of New and Amended Capital Raising Models 
While crowdfunding has received the most attention—and not all of it 
positive—other sections of the JOBS Act may provide better models for 
start-up fundraising. Crowdfunding has many detractors, including appar-
ently the SEC, which has delayed rulemaking beyond the 270 days allowed 
in the JOBS Act for implementation. In the interim, the SEC has promul-
gated the rules permitting general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings and 
general advertising in Rule 144A offerings.78 As mentioned, there is no cap 
on the amount that can be raised under Rule 506, and the reporting re-
quirements are not much more onerous than those for the crowdfunding 
exemption. The key difference is that general solicitation is only permitted 
if purchasers are restricted to accredited investors. So it is more like “high 
end” crowdfunding. At the same time, both Regulation A and Regulation 
A+ allow for general solicitation, higher offering amounts than available 
under the crowdfunding exemption, only somewhat more disclosure, and no 
restriction to accredited investors. Meanwhile, the existing Rule 504 allows 
general solicitation for offerings up to $1 million, so long as the offer is 
made exclusively in states that have their own registration systems for pub-
lic offerings.79 While this provision is then limited to certain states, as a 
practical matter such an offering may be adequate to raise $1 million—
which is all that is permitted under the new crowdfunding exemption any-
way. Accordingly, from a purely rational perspective, the new 
crowdfunding exemption may not be particularly compelling, especially if 
the SEC promulgates restrictive or onerous rules to implement it. 
  
 77 §§ 601-602, 126 Stat. at 326-27. 
 78 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 
and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 
230, 239, 242). 
 79 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(i) (2012). As mentioned above, at least one company has relied on Rule 
504 to conduct what it jokingly called an “IPO—Idaho Public Offering,” using Idaho state registration 
procedures to conduct an enterprise crowdfunding selling equity. See supra note 43 and accompanying 
text. 
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C. The CROWDFUND Act Disclosure Requirements May Present 
Serious Risks to Start-Ups’ IP and Business Strategies 
Notwithstanding the serious questions about whether the 
crowdfunding exemption is advisable from a regulatory perspective, or tru-
ly helpful for start-ups, the popular appeal of crowdfunding is such that 
many start-ups will likely use it once it is available. On the positive side, it 
may be one more avenue for deserving start-ups to access the capital they 
need to launch and grow. The focus on equity provides just the kind of 
working capital needed for start-ups to get serious about developing their IP 
portfolios. But the disclosure required for crowdfunding may present chal-
lenges and risks to first-time entrepreneurs. The mandated disclosures will 
be made public through the EDGAR system.80 While the SEC provides for 
the redaction of some sensitive, personally identifiable information (e.g., 
social security numbers in tax filings),81 it is not clear how far redaction 
requests could go beyond this. In fact, the SEC takes seriously the relation 
between crowdfunding and crowdsourcing, stating: 
The proposed rules are intended to align crowdfunding transactions under Section 4(a)(6) [of 
the JOBS Act] with the central tenets of the original concept of crowdfunding, in which the 
public—or the crowd—is presented with an opportunity to invest in an idea or business and 
individuals decide whether or not to invest after sharing information about the idea or busi-
ness with, and learning from, other members of the crowd. In this role, members of the 
crowd are not only sharing information about the idea or business, but also are expected to 
help evaluate the idea or business before deciding whether or not to invest.82 
Thus, the SEC clearly intends enough information to be made public about 
the issuer that a large number of potential investors can pore over and share, 
and that they may use to compare details of its finances, management, busi-
ness plan, and employees.  
The crowdfunding issuer will become a kind of junior reporting com-
pany, yet without the experience and legal counsel of a company that makes 
it to a traditional public offering. By contrast, Reg D offerings require only 
the filing of Form D—which contains minimal information—with the 
SEC.83 The more extensive disclosures required under Reg D are required 
to be made available only to purchasers, and thus need not be made public. 
At the same time, while private investors often negotiate for even more 
information rights than mandated by Reg D, they usually receive it under 
confidentiality provisions. The only equivalent requirement for public dis-
closures is under Regulation A and Regulation A+ offerings. But these al-
  
 80 Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,453. 
 81 Id. at 66,446. 
 82 Id. at 66,430 (footnote omitted).  
 83 17 C.F.R. § 230.503; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0076, FORM D, NOTICE OF 
EXEMPT OFFERING OF SECURITIES (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.  
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low for much higher offering amounts ($5 million and $50 million, respec-
tively, versus $1 million for the crowdfunding exemption). Also, the ex-
pense and sophistication needed to engage in one of these “mini-offerings” 
makes the model impractical for most of the early-stage start-ups that will 
likely pursue crowdfunding. 
There are substantial risks for early-stage start-ups to enter into an ex-
tensive disclosure regime. Such companies rarely have specialized counsel 
that can help them navigate the risks involved. Companies pursuing a Regu-
lation A offering or an IPO will generally have sophisticated securities at-
torneys, as well as IP attorneys if they have significant IP assets. Firms 
without such counsel risk disclosing patentable inventions—especially 
business methods—before applications have been filed and rights pre-
served. This issue will be particularly acute for ongoing periodic disclo-
sures, which tend to put time pressure on reporting companies because the 
regular deadlines can seem relentless.84 The likely place for such accidental 
disclosures will be in the mandated discussion of the firm’s business and 
financial condition discussion (compared by the SEC to the management’s 
discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations 
(known as the “MD&A”) under Regulation S-K for reporting companies).85 
But as the issuer becomes a kind of junior reporting company, it will also 
come under increased pressure to make other public statements. These dis-
closures can be the most perilous, especially where they include live re-
marks by company representatives (whether verbal or through social me-
dia). Descriptions of the company’s proposed products or services for pur-
poses of soliciting support in the crowdfunded offering will risk destroying 
patent rights. Part of engaging with the “crowd” may be a broad dialogue in 
which all manner of potential investors draw out responses from company 
representatives (official or otherwise) which disclose too much about the 
company’s plans and technologies. In fact, the SEC anticipates this happen-
ing and is already considering whether and how to make such disclosures 
part of the formal—and hence possibly liability-generating—disclosures 
under “Regulation Crowdfunding.”86 
In the event that potentially enabling disclosures of business methods 
or other inventions are made, the company will have to accelerate patent-
filing decisions. But without the funding to prepare and file a strong appli-
cation (lack of funding presumably being a major driver of the 
  
 84 Besides regular periodic reporting, the SEC is contemplating requiring material event reporting, 
similar to Form 8-K filings under the Exchange Act. See Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,450-52. 
This will put even more time pressure on and distract inexperienced start-ups, increasing the likelihood 
of accidental disclosure of sensitive information. 
 85 Id. at 66,437-44. Because the SEC at this time is not mandating the form of the business and 
financial condition disclosure reports, issuers may well overreport to stay on the safe side of an indeter-
minate line for compliance with Regulation Crowdfunding. 
 86 Id. at 66,452-54. 
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crowdfunding offering), the company may have to file an inferior applica-
tion, or no application at all. Thus, the crowdfunding effort may negatively 
alter the company’s IP strategy timeline. 
Ultimately, the disclosure required under the crowdfunding exemption 
means that start-ups will need to retain expensive securities and IP counsel 
before starting the crowdfunding process. But if they could afford such 
counsel, they likely would not be engaged in crowdfunding. The downsides 
of mandatory disclosure and a broad investor base (that may or may not 
have voting power) should discourage companies from using this funding 
model unless they really need it.  
Thus, the JOBS Act may unintentionally penalize the very firms that 
need its help the most. A number of commentators view the disclosure re-
quirements as necessary to mitigate what might otherwise be a major new 
avenue for fraudulent securities scams.87 However, Professor Edmund Kitch 
believes that it was a mistake for Congress to require public disclosures 
from crowdfunding companies.88 But this is because he takes the controver-
sial position that all mandatory disclosure requirements under the federal 
securities regulations system were a mistake.89 In keeping with the argu-
ments for the legalization of gambling and other risky activities, Kitch be-
lieves that individuals should have the right to invest their money wherever 
they choose, and through whatever means they want, without government 
intervention.90 Thus, he does not have a reason to distinguish crowdfunding 
from other investment vehicles. All should be matters purely between issu-
ers and investors with no government role as in mandatory disclosure re-
gimes. But Congress did not take this path, and it arguably tended to the 
opposite pole by imposing significant disclosure obligations on certain clas-
ses of issuers, now including crowdfunding firms. 
The crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act push start-ups into an 
advanced regulatory environment they may not be ready for. Whereas other 
titles in the JOBS Act allow emerging growth companies to stay private 
longer—giving them a longer period of privacy and confidentiality within 
which to develop business models, staff, and technologies—the 
  
 87 See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 4, at 1736-39. 
 88 See, e.g., John Kuo, Equity Crowdfunding Is Now Legal. How Can You Get Your Piece of the 
Action?, NERDWALLET (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/equity-
crowdfunding-legal-piece-action/ (noting that “Professor Edmund Kitch warns that simpler securities 
laws are necessary for equity crowdfunding to truly thrive,” and quoting Professor Kitch as saying, “If 
the government would simply create an open space for crowdfunding sites to operate, it could monitor 
their development and . . . pursue [specific] intervention. Unfortunately, the JOBS Act is enacted within 
the regulatory complexity of current securities law, and does not accomplish this simple goal” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 89 See Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Kitch & O’Connor: Should Crowdfunding Be Regulated?, 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 14, 2013), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2013/09/kitch-oconnor-
should-crowdfunding-be.html.  
 90 See supra note 88. 
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CROWDFUND Act will rush start-ups who use it and force them to be-
come junior reporting companies. And whereas other titles of the JOBS Act 
relax disclosure requirements for other kinds of offerings—including the 
new confidential IPO draft registration statement that Twitter recently 
used—the CROWDFUND Act imposes arguably a higher-than-usual 
amount of disclosure as compared to that required for similarly situated 
offerings (e.g., Rule 504 offerings can also raise $1 million but have none 
of the public disclosures of the CROWDFUND Act, unless the issuer relies 
on the state registration option). The period of privacy is critical for start-
ups that have nearly impossible levels of uncertainty across their business 
model, technologies, and markets. Further, the ability to be disruptive often 
relies on the element of surprise. A potentially disruptive start-up that needs 
to telegraph details about its model and plans through public disclosures 
beginning at the earliest stages of the firm is likely to lose much of that 
element of surprise and find its ability to successfully disrupt an industry 
limited (as the incumbents will have been able to prepare to defend their 
entrenched interests).  
III. MANAGING CROWDFUNDING INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS ABOUT 
START-UP IP PORTFOLIOS 
Beyond the disclosure issues affecting start-up IP strategies under the 
CROWDFUND Act, the crowdfunding concept generally presents issues 
for management’s interaction with shareholders. Publicly traded companies 
develop significant expertise and staff just to deal with issues arising with a 
large, diffuse set of shareholders. Start-ups will be in no such position to 
deal with this kind of base. Further, they may use crowdfunding to avoid 
professional investors such as VCs, even though those professionals often 
bring valuable expertise that can guide the start-up to develop the sophisti-
cation to manage a base of public shareholders. 
Professional or experienced start-up investors such as tech angels and 
VCs understand the value of IP. They often know more than the founders 
about the realities and expenses of building IP portfolios with limited re-
sources. Tough decisions need to be made about what to patent among 
competing promising inventions. Timing decisions for applications also 
require experience. Likewise, some inventions may be protectable as trade 
secrets. And in some industries, such as software, copyright will play an 
equal role with patents for protection of the core products developed. On 
top of all this, a strong brand—manifested through distinctive, federally 
registered trademarks—may play a more important long-term role than 
patents on any particular technology. Unsophisticated investors, who may 
constitute a large percentage of crowdfunders, will not be able to offer any 
help on these matters. 
Even if some crowdfunders have such expertise, a start-up would need 
to bring them into a special confidential relationship (such as often happens 
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with private placement investors) in order to give them privileged infor-
mation necessary to help develop the IP strategy. But this in turn might run 
afoul of fair disclosure concepts, which seek to have all outside sharehold-
ers on the same footing with regard to company information. Insiders, by 
contrast, will have access to nonpublic information, but they are then re-
stricted in their ability to trade in the company’s stock based on such insider 
information. We do not yet know whether the SEC will treat a crowdfunded 
issuer as a kind of public company, which requires such insider-outsider 
distinctions for information dissemination. 
Further, utilizing crowdfunding early in a start-up’s life could deter 
professional investors from investing later. Many VCs already lament 
bloated cap tables from too many friend and family investors in companies 
the VCs are otherwise interested in financing. This situation means unpre-
dictable votes on shareholder issues and more potential for litigation from 
early-stage investors who get substantially diluted in later rounds or disa-
gree with the company’s direction and management.  
Angels and VCs also usually understand the risks of IP portfolio value 
during the life of the company and in bankruptcy or dissolution. Even 
though significant amounts of money may have been spent on procuring 
patents, the portfolio may be worthless if the product or service to which it 
is directed proves to be commercially unfeasible. Of course, the portfolio 
may be monetized in other ways, and experienced VCs may have guidance 
on this as well. But unsophisticated crowdfunders may wildly over- or un-
derestimate the value of the start-up’s portfolio. This shortcoming, in turn, 
could put them at odds with company management in how to manage and 
monetize the portfolio. 
The upshot is that management may become more conservative be-
cause of pressure from crowdfunders with unrealistic expectations about IP 
portfolio development and management (as well as about other corporate 
matters!). This pressure could escalate into litigation, similar to the share-
holder activism we increasingly see in publicly traded companies. Share-
holder activism can provide helpful discipline to management of large enti-
ties that may get out of touch, but it may not be appropriate for early-stage 
start-ups that need a lot of room to maneuver while exploring risky technol-
ogies and business models. Some have suggested that crowdfunding only 
be done through non-voting stock with mandatory buyout provisions allow-
ing the company to later reduce the cap table.91 Such equity structuring 
could indeed reduce problems with crowdfunding shareholders. But the 
shareholders would have to agree to buy shares under these conditions. It 
remains to be seen whether a crowdfunding market could develop around 
such terms. 
  
 91 For example, Ted Sichelman offered ideas like this in an IPProfs listserv exchange on 
crowdfunding earlier this year. 
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Start-ups that employ crowdfunding will have to learn how to manage 
the expectations of a broad, diffuse base of shareholders, many of whom 
may be quite unsophisticated. In fact, given the “democratizing” effect of 
crowdfunding and the low investment amounts possible, the average 
crowdfunder may be far less sophisticated than the average retail investor in 
public markets. This knowledge gap will require “investor relations” skill 
and staff, which may be beyond the tool kit of the usual start-up founder or 
employee. Thus, the company may have to retain counsel or consultants to 
develop or administer the investor relations function, which will only add to 
the start-up’s burn rate. 
Provided that the start-up can muster the investor relations function, 
one of the main goals of such a program will have to be investor education 
about the realities of IP portfolio development and management. First, in-
vestors will need to know that patent procurement may be one of the start-
up’s single largest fixed costs recurring on an annual basis. Second, not 
everything will be patentable, nor will the company be able to patent every-
thing that is patentable. Tough decisions will have to be made, and some 
seemingly valuable things will be left unprotected. Investors will likely not 
have a say in this—and will not know all the important inside information 
on the inventions and patent application decisions—and will have to be 
comfortable “going along for the ride.” Because of the perceived nature and 
rhetoric of crowdfunding, crowdfunders may be more inclined than public 
market retail investors to believe they have an active ownership role in the 
company—including a say in important management decisions. Finally, 
investor relations staff must strive to educate investors that even expensive 
patents and impressive-looking IP portfolios may turn out to be worthless 
during the life of the company, as well as in bankruptcy or dissolution.  
CONCLUSION 
The JOBS Act reduces the disclosure required for many forms of fi-
nancing emerging growth companies. Companies can stay private longer. 
They can file confidential draft registration statements for IPOs. Audited 
financial statements need only be provided for the preceding two years be-
fore going public, not three. Similarly, general solicitation is now available 
for certain Rule 506 offerings, and an enhanced “Regulation A+” allows for 
mini-public offerings up to $50 million.  
Yet, the crowdfunding exemption seems to impose heavier regulation 
and mandatory disclosures than the relaxed standard for equivalent alternate 
offerings. For a meager $1 million raise, crowdfunded companies will need 
to become junior reporting companies. They will need to publicly disclose 
information about shareholders who hold more than 20 percent of their eq-
uity, as well as the ways in which such shareholders’ equity rights could be 
used to harm crowdfunders’ equity rights. 
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Despite this inferiority of crowdfunding to other funding avenues, it is 
expected that many start-ups will use it once the SEC promulgates the final 
rules. The populist and rhetorical appeal of the form—together with the 
success of project crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter—virtually ensures 
there will be initial attempts to use it for enterprise crowdfunding. If it al-
lows deserving start-ups to obtain funding they would not otherwise have 
received, then it may be worth it. This outcome could be especially valuable 
for start-ups who need funding to start developing and managing an IP port-
folio.  
Start-ups that use crowdfunding, however, face a number of potential 
issues. First, they will have a broad, diffuse ownership base more like that 
of a large public company than of a nimble start-up. Differences of opinion 
and challenges to management may be more widespread than in a tradition-
al privately-held start-up. Second, such challenges may well be on IP strat-
egies and tactics. Because the average crowdfunder is likely to be less so-
phisticated than the angels and VCs that usually invest in start-ups, he may 
balk at the expense of patent applications, while also expressing concern 
over the necessarily difficult decision to seek patent protection on one in-
vention and not another. Third, the requirements of disclosure on inexperi-
enced young companies may lead to compromised IP assets. Given the re-
luctance or inability of early-stage start-ups to hire specialized counsel in 
corporate law, securities law, and IP, their management may inadvertently 
make enabling disclosures that will jeopardize patent rights.  
Crowdfunding may help some start-ups financially even as it may 
jeopardize their IP strategies and implementation. To minimize this harm, 
start-ups will need to develop strong investor relations staff that can man-
age the expectations of disparate crowdfunders even before the offering 
takes place. They will also need to hire experienced securities and IP coun-
sel in advance of the offering. But both of these will require money that the 
start-up does not have (else it would not be engaging in the fundraising). 
This in turn may limit the effectiveness of enterprise crowdfunding of start-
ups. 
